There was a simple way to defend Olivia Miles before the three-point shot became a more credible part of her game.
Give her some space.
That does not solve everything she does with the ball. Miles can still use the screen, change pace, get into the paint and find the next defender who has to help. But going under a ball screen gives the on-ball defender a better chance to stay between her and the rim. It protects against the part of her game that has always been harder to deal with.
The calculation changes when the space itself becomes dangerous.
Golden State gave us a useful example in June.
The Valkyries were already one of the WNBA's best defensive teams. A week before the game, Golden State ranked second in defensive rating, with a roster built around versatile defenders who could switch, pressure the ball and protect the paint. This was not a defense searching for an answer.
And going under Miles made sense.
She entered the June 4 game 2-for-18 from three in her first nine WNBA games. If the choice was between letting her turn the corner and activate the driving and passing game, or asking her to make threes, Golden State had a reasonable place to start.
Miles made eight of them.
She finished 8-for-11 from three, setting a WNBA rookie single-game record. Afterward, both Miles and Courtney Williams described Golden State as repeatedly going under the ball screens. Miles understood why. The Valkyries were protecting against her drive. The shots were the space that coverage gave her.
That is what interests me about the game.
The result does not by itself make the starting coverage unsound. An 8-for-11 night is an extreme result, and one game does not prove every defense now has to chase Miles over every screen.
What it shows is what happens when the price of the original choice changes.
If the defender goes under, Miles may have room to pull up.
If the defender starts fighting over, something else changes. That defender can end up trailing the action. Miles can turn the corner with the screener's defender in front of her and the original defender behind her.
Now we are back in the part of her game that already made her difficult to guard.
She can slow down. She can keep the big engaged. She can find the roller. She can wait for the next defender to leave an assignment.
The three does not need to replace any of that.
It can reopen it.
That distinction matters when thinking about Miles' development.
She returned from the ACL injury that cost her the 2023-24 season and shot 40.6 percent from three at Notre Dame in 2024-25. The percentage fell to 35.1 percent at TCU. Her first few WNBA games included that 2-for-18 start before the Golden State performance.
That is hardly a straight line.
I would also be careful about turning the injury itself into a neat cause-and-effect story. Miles has talked about how the experience changed the way she thought about missed shots, and the rehabilitation period included time to work on her shooting. That is useful context. It does not mean an ACL injury mechanically produced a better shooter.
The more useful development story is what the added capability does to the rest of the floor.
A defense can still decide that giving Miles a three is preferable to letting her get downhill. Golden State had good reasons to make exactly that bet.
But the bet now carries more risk.
That may be the important difference between adding a skill and becoming a different player.
Miles did not need to give up the pace, passing or ball-screen creation that already defined her game. The jumper gives defenses another problem to account for before those strengths even begin to work.
Sometimes development changes what a player can do.
Sometimes it changes what the defense can afford to let her do.